RAEL JEAN ISAAC

For all its huge achievements, as its 56th year dawns, modern Israel faces the bleakest prospects in its short history.

Yes, one might argue the future looked more perilous in 1948 and 1949, when the small Jewish population of the new-minted state, attacked by all its Arab neighbors, subject to an arms boycott by the Western powers, fought to survive. But then there was hope, determination, unity of purpose, a sense among Israelis -- and Jews abroad -- that they could not, dare not, fail. Most of the world, horrified by the Holocaust, identified with the gallant battle of the Jewish remnant to create a state that would give them, after two thousand years, once again their own place in the sun. Today, after 56 years of the Arab-Israel war (with only brief lulls in the fighting) the people of Israel seems uncertain and divided. The world’s media (and politicians) are in competition to see who can turn reality more absurdly on its head. As Cynthia Ozick puts it, they use "sleight-of-hand trickeries--such as the hallucinatory notion that the defense measures of a perennially beleaguered people constitute colonization and victimization; or that the Jewish state is to blame for the aggressions committed against it."

While it is tempting to wrap the Jewish state in the mantle of hapless victim of the world's baseless hate and the Arab world's malignity, Israel, reluctant as we may be to confront this, bears much of the blame for her current parlous condition. The state, under a series of leaders of both major political parties, has weaved and wobbled. In an excellent, largely unremarked essay in Azure (Winter 2003) entitled "On Jewish Character," Yoram Hazony focuses on Israel's failure to produce sufficient individuals with the character "for maintaining political and cultural independence over time." Hazony identifies this missing essential quality of character as the ability "to stand firm before adversity."

In terms of building character, early Zionists, writes Hazony, had two expectations for the state. The first was that the state would free Jews from the struggle to be accepted in European society, where the promise of social advancement was dependent on renunciation of one's Jewishness in a manner irreconcilable with the commitments of character. Only in a national Jewish society would a Jew be able to pursue personal success in every field without having to break faith with his past. In this, Hazony says, the state has unequivocally succeeded: within Israel, Jews have been restored to the "inner wholeness" of which Herzl spoke, where there is unity between "our ambitions as individuals, and our loyalty to our forefathers and to our people." But this first and fully realized expectation, argues Hazony, is only a formal condition, opening the door to the second substantive Zionist expectation: that the state would establish "traditions and institutions capable of inculcating character in successive generations of young Jews."

Hazony points to something that has long troubled this writer: the unwillingness of recent Israeli leaders, regardless of party, to speak clearly to the public about the need for sacrifice and hardship to achieve long-term goals. In regard to external threats, this means, Hazony writes, "setting out a course of diplomatic confrontation and war that may require long years of sacrifice and suffering in order to lay the foundations for a better postwar order." But where is the Israeli leader who will speak the truth, who will say, like Churchill, that he has nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat? Instead each Prime Minister promises the voter peace and security just around the corner if he only pulls the right lever in the voting booth.

It is worth quoting Hazony at length on this point: "One may interpret this reluctance [to speak the truth] on the part of our political leaders in one of two ways: Either much of Israel's political leadership is without the strength of character necessary to risk electoral defeat in order to tell the public the truth; or else this leadership does have such strength, but is prevented from making use of it because the public lacks the character to bear such news and would reject a leader who comes forth with such a message. But whichever explanation one chooses, its implications with respect to the political personality of the Jewish state are not flattering. A democratic regime in which elected leaders refrain from persuading their public of the need for painful policies is one that is limited to choosing between that which is least painful and that which can be obscured by dishonesty...Such a state is one that is crippled by an inability to maintain a difficult course in the face of duress. It is crippled by lack of character."

While Hazony avoids specifics, successive Israeli Prime Ministers, cabinets and legislatures are testament to the failure of character. Only in the first two decades of Israeli statehood was there some steadiness of purpose: it was reflected in the slogan Ein breira, "There is no choice," no choice but to stand firm against Arab aggression. But Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of 1967 seduced Israelis into the delusion that there were now "alternatives." Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the war the Israeli government announced its willingness to return all territories in exchange for peace. When this was met with the three For all its huge achievements, as its 56th year dawns, modern Israel faces the bleakest prospects in its short history.

Yes, one might argue the future looked more perilous in 1948 and 1949, when the small Jewish population of the new-minted state, attacked by all its Arab neighbors, subject to an arms boycott by the Western powers, fought to survive. But then there was hope, determination, unity of purpose, a sense among Israelis -- and Jews abroad -- that they could not, dare not, fail. Most of the world, horrified by the Holocaust, identified with the gallant battle of the Jewish remnant to create a state that would give them, after two thousand years, once again their own place in the sun. Today, after 56 years of the Arab-Israel war (with only brief lulls in the fighting) the people of Israel seems uncertain and divided. The world’s media (and politicians) are in competition to see who can turn reality more absurdly on its head. As Cynthia Ozick puts it, they use "sleight-of-hand trickeries--such as the hallucinatory notion that the defense measures of a perennially beleaguered people constitute colonization and victimization; or that the Jewish state is to blame for the aggressions committed against it."

While it is tempting to wrap the Jewish state in the mantle of hapless victim of the world's baseless hate and the Arab world's malignity, Israel, reluctant as we may be to confront this, bears much of the blame for her current parlous condition. The state, under a series of leaders of both major political parties, has weaved and wobbled. In an excellent, largely unremarked essay in Azure (Winter 2003) entitled "On Jewish Character," Yoram Hazony focuses on Israel's failure to produce sufficient individuals with the character "for maintaining political and cultural independence over time." Hazony identifies this missing essential quality of character as the ability "to stand firm before adversity."

In terms of building character, early Zionists, writes Hazony, had two expectations for the state. The first was that the state would free Jews from the struggle to be accepted in European society, where the promise of social advancement was dependent on renunciation of one's Jewishness in a manner irreconcilable with the commitments of character. Only in a national Jewish society would a Jew be able to pursue personal success in every field without having to break faith with his past. In this, Hazony says, the state has unequivocally succeeded: within Israel, Jews have been restored to the "inner wholeness" of which Herzl spoke, where there is unity between "our ambitions as individuals, and our loyalty to our forefathers and to our people." But this first and fully realized expectation, argues Hazony, is only a formal condition, opening the door to the second substantive Zionist expectation: that the state would establish "traditions and institutions capable of inculcating character in successive generations of young Jews."

Hazony points to something that has long troubled this writer: the unwillingness of recent Israeli leaders, regardless of party, to speak clearly to the public about the need for sacrifice and hardship to achieve long-term goals. In regard to external threats, this means, Hazony writes, "setting out a course of diplomatic confrontation and war that may require long years of sacrifice and suffering in order to lay the foundations for a better postwar order." But where is the Israeli leader who will speak the truth, who will say, like Churchill, that he has nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat? Instead each Prime Minister promises the voter peace and security just around the corner if he only pulls the right lever in the voting booth.

It is worth quoting Hazony at length on this point: "One may interpret this reluctance [to speak the truth] on the part of our political leaders in one of two ways: Either much of Israel's political leadership is without the strength of character necessary to risk electoral defeat in order to tell the public the truth; or else this leadership does have such strength, but is prevented from making use of it because the public lacks the character to bear such news and would reject a leader who comes forth with such a message. But whichever explanation one chooses, its implications with respect to the political personality of the Jewish state are not flattering. A democratic regime in which elected leaders refrain from persuading their public of the need for painful policies is one that is limited to choosing between that which is least painful and that which can be obscured by dishonesty...Such a state is one that is crippled by an inability to maintain a difficult course in the face of duress. It is crippled by lack of character."

While Hazony avoids specifics, successive Israeli Prime Ministers, cabinets and legislatures are testament to the failure of character. Only in the first two decades of Israeli statehood was there some steadiness of purpose: it was reflected in the slogan Ein breira, "There is no choice," no choice but to stand firm against Arab aggression. But Israel’s victory in the Six Day War of 1967 seduced Israelis into the delusion that there were now "alternatives." Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the war the Israeli government announced its willingness to return all territories in exchange for peace. When this was met with the three collapsed when Arafat insisted on an unfettered “right to return” for Arab refugees, i.e. the end of the Jewish state.

Sharon has proved the most unsteady leader of them all. His government became a paragon of giddiness, as Foreign Minister Shimon Peres publicly contradicted Sharon’s announced policies, and Sharon contradicted himself. Sharon then rammed through his cabinet acceptance of the Road Map. A leader with character would have refused to accept a document that was as much a diktat as the Munich agreement of 1938 dismembering Czechoslovakia. Four power centers, three of them deeply hostile to Israel (the European Union, the UN and the Soviet Union), without any consultation or input from the Israeli government, imposed a formula for what amounted to Israeli retreat to the 1949 borders. Incredibly, when the Road Map foundered on the single requirement for the Palestinian Authority – an effort to control terror – Sharon produced a plan for unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza (including the 21 Jewish communities there) and from northern Samaria.

Why a policy of preemptive surrender? Since the action defies logic, we are forced to look at Sharon’s own explanation(s). Sharon claimed, and this was echoed by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, that otherwise “initiatives that are detrimental to Israel may be brought up.” Presumably then, by coming up with his own plan for limited withdrawals, Sharon was staving off more radical proposals from the “international community” in the offing. But Sharon had already agreed to a far more detrimental plan in the Road Map. So what was he staving off? The Quartet met in the wake of the Sharon plan and all four, including the United States, applauded the initiative as the “first step” in implementing the Road Map.

That leaves the second “explanation” Sharon has proffered: “One thing is clear to me. The people of Israel did not elect me to sit idly by for four years. I was elected to find the path that will lead this people to the tranquility, security and peace they so deserve.” First of all Sharon was not elected. The Likud Party was elected, made Sharon Prime Minister and has now repudiated his plan. The last sentence is the ludicrous boilerplate that has been the centerpiece of election promises, as if any Israeli government had it in its power to bring Israel “tranquility” and “peace” when the Arabs are determined to destroy the state. It is not Sharon’s mission, as he seems to think, to “do something,” (“not sit idly by”) if those restless maneuvers are going to reduce Israel’s security, demoralize its public and energize its enemies. What else can possibly be the effect of Israel’s retreat under terror? Sharon’s timing is also bizarre. He was proposing retreat at a time when the Palestinian Authority’s image was hurt by its identification with the Iraqi insurgents and the massive Palestinian Arab demonstrations on behalf of the the brutal murderers of the civilian contractors in Fallujah. As for President Bush, he had priorities far more urgent than a Palestinian state.

The usual cry that goes up is “But what is the alternative?” The alternative all along has been to show steadiness of purpose under adversity. If Israel had maintained that simple principle of “no negotiations with terrorists,” Oslo would never have happened and Israel would not be facing the forbidding landscape she does now.

Today, steadiness of purpose requires military action to obtain victory over the terror factions that Israel so recklessly enabled through Oslo. In “The Trap of ‘A Limited Conflict’” (Outpost, April 2004) Israeli Col. Yehuda Wegman describes the need to obtain a decisive military decision – which the Israel Defense Forces could easily achieve – if they were not prevented by the government’s suicidal policy of a “prolonged, decisionless attrition.” Making shahids of the Palestinian Authority and the numerous terror factions would doubtless cause a temporary clamor, but no more than the ineffectual limited actions Israel already takes.

And then “character” would require Israel to stand firm behind another principle, one that it should have adopted decades ago. And that is insistence that Israel’s precondition for negotiations is that the Arab refugee problem be solved – by the 22 Arab states. As Ruth King and I noted in Outpost of September 2003 “Putting First Things Last: The 55 Year Failure to Address the Arab Refugee Problem” the “right to return” of over four million Arabs to a Jewish state comprising a mere 8,000 square miles and housing only six and a half million people, is an insane demand. If the Arabs are serious about accepting a Jewish state, they must show their good faith by absorbing all those registered as refugees with UNRWA, including the 655,000 registered in Judea and Samaria and the 907,000 in Gaza. If they are not serious, there is nothing to negotiate.

Were the government of Israel to display character, the state would be subject to far less pressure than it experiences today. Israel’s unsteadiness invites outside pressures. Because of its moral weakness, Israel makes itself the world’s punching bag. Even now, as President Bush, in the wake of the Iraqi prison abuse scandal, casts around for a way to prove to the Arab world that he wishes it well, he is already, as Fouad Ajami noted in the Wall Street Journal of May 12, paying in Israeli coin. If Israel’s position were firm and predictable, her governments might be accused of stubbornness and intransigence, but they would be respected. If it were understood that on core principles the government of Israel would not budge, the rest of the world would be forced to consider how Israel’s preconditions could be met. The refugee camps would cease to be an immutable given; doing something about them would be forced on the world’s agenda.

What would happen if Israel had a leader of character? It is possible that such a Prime Minister would be repudiated at the polls. Perhaps Israel plays out a Shakespearean tragedy where a fatal flaw of national character determines the outcome. But we do not know. We do not know if a leader could rally the nation because no leader has tested the nation. We do know that there are many in Israel who cry out for such leadership. On May 14 the Israeli newspaper Hatzofeh published a "Prayer before Going to Battle" which concludes: "Please save us from our leaders. We can already handle our enemies." And so surely, before the curtain falls, the people of Israel, who have achieved so much in so many areas in the first half century of their modern state, deserve the chance to be tested.