Roger A. Gerber

Juliette Binoche, the Academy Award winning French actress, has agreed to star in a film entitled “Disengagement” which will explore the human drama surrounding the 2005 expulsion of Jews from their homes in Gaza and northern Samaria and the withdrawal of Israel’s armed forces from Gaza. Apparently the impact of the so-called disengagement plan resonates beyond the borders of Israel, although its ramifications reverberate most deeply within those borders.
In the wake of his overwhelming 2003 election victory over Amram Mitzna, who had proposed that Israel unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, Ariel Sharon thrust his “disengagement” plan upon a surprised Israeli public in 2004. Sharon explained to William Safire: “I discussed this between me and myself and came up with a new initiative.” During the election campaign Sharon had forcefully rejected Mitzna’s proposal stating: “A unilateral withdrawal is not a recipe for peace. It is a recipe for war.” And subsequently, according to Mitzna’s own account, Sharon lectured him “on the strategic importance of Netzarim and the historic importance of Kfar Darom.” After much controversy, Sharon’s plan was forcibly implemented by the IDF and the police in August 2005.
In a televised speech to the nation literally on the eve of the implementation of his plan, Prime Minister Sharon promised: “The disengagement will allow us to look inward. Our national agenda will change. In our economic policy, we will be free to turn to closing social gaps and to waging a real fight on poverty. We will advance education and increase the personal security of every citizen in the country.” Not one of these assertions has been validated by events.

Instead, as its many critics predicted, the plan has been a complete failure. Haaretz’s prominent dovish commentator Yoel Marcus, to whom Sharon had revealed his disengagement plan in a famous interview in February 2004, wrote (November 21, 2006): “Regrettably, it is now becoming clear that the most extreme and pessimistic Jewish settlers are the ones who were right. The Palestinians do not want to recognize Israel or come to terms with its existence.” (In August 2005, on the eve of the expulsions from Gaza, Marcus had written, “When the withdrawal is complete, Israel will be the darling of the world.”) Another prominent supporter of disengagement, Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg of Bar Ilan University, wrote (June 29, 2006): “As an early Israeli supporter of unilateral disengagement, I admit that this plan, like the earlier Oslo ‘peace process,’ has failed.” Former IDF Chief of Staff Gen. Moshe Ya’alon also was blunt: “There is no doubt that the disengagement failed. The failure was to be expected.”

A poll taken on behalf of Israel Army Radio just a few months after the plan’s implementation found that fully 70% believed that plan did not contribute to peace and a majority said disengagement was “of no practical value” (Jerusalem Post, February 13, 2006). Even Prime Minister Olmert weakly allowed that the Gaza disengagement “proved that maybe a unilateral process has its weaknesses ….”

The parlous consequences of the plan are so extensive and of such depth that only a brief summary can be attempted in this article:

1. A terror base

Gaza has become a base for terror that, with Iranian assistance, threatens much of southern Israel within the Green Line. Maj-Gen. Yoav Galant, currently Head of IDF’s Southern Command, writes that “rocket launchings toward Ashkelon, Sderot and other places are a daily occurrence, averaging 50 to 60 rockets per month….”

The most salient threat is to Ashkelon, a city of 120,000 and the site of Israel’s major desalination plant, a key electric power station generating about 40% of Israel’s electric power, chemical storage facilities and the oil pipeline from Eilat. Ashkelon is located about six miles from the northern border of the Gaza Strip and from the former Israeli villages of Dugit, Elei Sinai and Nisanit, which were established over twenty years ago as a buffer protecting Ashkelon and other towns in the area. It is these former Israeli villages that are now used to train terrorists and to launch rockets upon the populations of Sderot, Ashkelon and other communities.

Even such a strong supporter of the disengagement as the very dovish Ami Ayalon, former naval commander and General Security Services Chief and currently candidate for Labor Party leader in the April primary, wanted to make an exception of them, asserting in May 2005 that “there is no reason at all to evacuate the three northern Gaza communities.”

It was reported on July 5, 2006 that “a buffer zone will be created in the northern part of the Strip in order to prevent Kassam fire;” this is of course precisely the function the three settlements on the northern Gaza border fulfilled prior to their destruction. Labor Knesset member, and currently deputy defense minister, Ephraim Sneh, averred that there is “no escape from prolonged ground presence at the launch sites” — this just ten months after the disengagement. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, Some withdrawal! Some disengagement!

2. Increased Likelihood of Gaza War

Alex Fishman, security commentator for the Israeli daily Yediot Achronot, reported on March 14, 2007 that war in Gaza is “beginning to look inevitable” as the result of the incessant rocket and other terror attacks. In March 2007 the Director of Israel’s General Security Services (Shabak) warned the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Kiryat Gat, only 36 miles south of Tel Aviv, is likely to fall within the range of improved rockets developed in, or smuggled into Gaza. Yuval Diskin of Shin Bet forecasts that as many as 200,000 Israelis within a 12 mile range of Gaza will be under the threat of missile fire this year.

Former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon has stated “If we want to go on living, we may have no other choice than to launch an Operation Defensive Shield in Gaza.” Steven Erlanger reported in The New York Times (April 1, 2007) that Diskin and current IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi are worried that the current “calm” is utilized by Hamas “to consolidate its power in Gaza and enhance its military capacities.” “If the Hamas buildup continues, and the rockets and tunnels continue, at the end of the day we will have to do something about it,” Diskin said.

3. Terrorists Have Free Hand to Smuggle Weapons and Train for War

Hamas has established an army of at least 8,000 fighters, some of whom have been trained in Iran. Now that Israel has relinquished the protective Philadelphi Corridor—which it was entitled to retain under the Oslo accords—Hamas is free to equip itself with weaponry manufactured locally and smuggled in through Sinai. (Israel’s former Southern Command chief Gen. Doron Almog had warned Israeli control of the Corridor was essential to insure deterrence, interdiction of weapons, and swift reprisal when required). In addition, Hamas has over 10,000 additional security forces and Fatah has several thousand of its own fighters. Maj-Gen. Galant recently wrote: “The Palestinians in Gaza are well organized in four brigades … each with its own commander. They have battalions, companies and platoons, as well as special forces dealing with sniping, infantry, explosives and anti-tank weapons. All the know-how is brought in from abroad – from Iran, Syria and Hizbullah, and everything is following a plan. This is an organization with leadership, a doctrine, structure, training, weaponry, manpower and a goal – to establish a serious military force in Gaza.” (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, April 19, 2007).

In surrendering the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel basically lost control of the influx of both weapons and terrorists. Both can now pass through the crossing unhindered (Haaretz, February 8, 2006). Diskin has warned that Gaza could become another Lebanon.

Nor are the perilous consequences limited to Gaza; Diskin admits that since the withdrawal from four Jewish towns in northern Samaria the IDF has found it increasingly difficult to control the area and the intelligence arm has had greater difficulty gathering information. “Samaria has become the land of Islamic Jihad following the disengagement,” Diskin stated.

4. Economic Costs

In contrast to the economic dividend that Sharon and his supporters declared would now improve the quality of life in Israel, disengagement has proved extremely costly. Aside from the huge cost of carrying out the disengagement itself, it will cost $400,000,000 to reinforce homes and provide shelters in Sderot and the four other towns close to Gaza. This does not include the cost of reinforcing homes and facilities in and around Ashkelon. The water commissioner has estimated that it will cost billions of dollars to deal with the threat to the desalination plant posed by the raw sewage coming on the coastal current from Gaza.

Then there is the incalculable cost of military measures that have been and will be taken to address the new terror threats and rocket attacks from Gaza. This includes the costs attendant upon the military actions in Gaza following the murder of two Israeli soldiers within the Green Line and the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Finally, there are the huge economic costs stemming from the dislocation of 25 communities, the loss of a large percentage of Israel’s agricultural export earnings, and the continuing costs of caring for thousands of internal Jewish refugees from Gaza.

5. Incentives to Terrorists

There is ample evidence that the Palestinians perceive the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a victory for terrorism and it is likely that the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections is attributable in large part to the disengagement. Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki reported that “more than three quarters of the Palestinians view the pullout as a victory for the armed struggle.” (cnsnews.com, June 28, 2005)

The Palestinians also regard the IDF withdrawal as a precedent for compelling future Israeli withdrawals. Hamas-controlled television has recently broadcast numerous times—as often as seven a day—a statement by the late Sheikh Yassin linking the retreat from Netzarim to the imagined future retreat from Tel Aviv, concluding: “Tel Aviv is gone. They are defeated, they have no words left.”

On the first anniversary of the IDF total withdrawal from Gaza, Yoel Marcus wrote: “Netanyahu was right when he said that quitting Lebanon and Gaza without agreements would be interpreted by the Palestinians as a victory for them and a sign of our weakness. That Hamas and Hezbollah have grown stronger after our departure is not accidental.” (September 12, 2006). In The New York Times Steven Erlanger quotes a senior American official: “If Hamas believes that Israel can’t deal with casualties, and that it won the war for Gaza, why shouldn’t it transfer resistance to the West Bank?” (May 26, 2005). In the words of former Defense Minister Moshe Arens, “Palestinian terrorism has been rewarded and encouraged, and Israel will have to suffer the consequences.”

6. Morale in Israel Undermined

Prior to disengagement, in a speech to the Israel Policy Forum (June 9, 2005), then Vice Premier Ehud Olmert promised that disengagement would “bring more security, greater safety, more prosperity, and a lot of joy” for Middle East peoples. In fact, said Olmert, “everything depends on the success of this disengagement.”

On the contrary, says Ya’alon, disengagement vitiated all of Israel’s achievements in fighting terror during the campaign of 2003. As he put it, with the implementation of the disengagement “everything went haywire.” (Haaretz, July 6, 2006). The daily rocket attacks on Sderot and the Ashkelon area have killed and maimed several Israelis, caused trauma to the populace and led some residents to abandon their homes. Israelis have come to realize, especially after last summer’s Lebanon war, that their leadership is incompetent; one poll found Prime Minister Olmert had the support of only 3% of the populace.

Dan Schueftan of the University of Haifa, author of a 1999 book (in Hebrew) entitled Disengagement, widely regarded as the major intellectual influence on the formulation of Sharon’s plan, admitted in an astonishing interview in The Jerusalem Post (April 5, 2007) that disengagement “has nothing whatsoever to do with peace” and concessions and withdrawals by Israel only arouse more hostility and increase the likelihood of terrorism. He avers that the strengthening of Israeli society was the principal purpose of disengagement.

Far from achieving this, in the judgment of Daniel Pipes, disengagement has “divided Israel in ways that may poison the body politic for decades.” Former Foreign Minister Moshe Arens called the forcible expulsion of Jewish citizens from their homes, businesses and even cemeteries “an act of barbarism that would not be countenanced anywhere else in the Western world.” (Haaretz, August 2, 2005).

Moreover disengagement did not really even disengage Israel from Gaza. As Nadav Haetzni wrote presciently: "Whatever happens, there will be no disengagement. The implementation of Sharon's plan will booby-trap Israel: the more power is left in its hands--at border crossings, in the security 'envelope'--we'll be perceived as responsible for everything in the Gaza Strip. The more power we relinquish, the more dangerous the freedom of action granted to the terror state that will arise. … Real disengagement from the Palestinians won't take place, but emergent disengagement among the various components of Israeli society will definitely be achieved." (Maariv, August 15, 2005).

7. Perilous Precedents For Future Negotiations

Israel withdrew its forces from every inch of Gaza all the way to the Green Line, and destroyed every one of its settlements, thus, as was noted earlier, setting a dangerous precedent for future negotiations over Judea and Samaria. In addition, as Gen. Ya’alon points out, the precedent of destroying settlements with nothing in return will likely haunt Israel. Despite Israel’s past insistence on demilitarization and border control, the Gaza disengagement was implemented with no provision for demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Not only was there no quid pro quo for the withdrawal and the expulsions, but Israel did not even obtain formal international recognition that it had fully ended its occupation of Gaza and was relieved of any further responsibility in respect of the Strip.

8. Diminished Training of IDF Affected Performance in Lebanon War

Maj. Gen Yiftah Ron-Tal attributed the decline in the IDF capabilities in Lebanon to the inordinate amount of time spent training for the disengagement instead of training for warfare against Israel’s enemies. It should be noted that about 50,000 soldiers and police were mobilized for dealing with the expulsion of Jews from Gaza compared to about 30,000 soldiers at the peak of the Hezbollah war in Lebanon.

9. Gaza Disengagement Prompted Hezbollah War

The then Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee,Tzachi Hanegbi, who as a cabinet minister in the Sharon government voted in support of disengagement, now believes that it “neither contributed to the security of Israel nor to peace.” Hanegbi says that the expulsion of Jews from Gaza was interpreted as weakness “and this weakness prompted attacks in Gaza and along the northern border.” (ynet news, October 5, 2006).

10. Diminution of Democracy in Israel

A serious adverse consequence of disengagement was the stifling of dissent and the attenuation of democratic norms. The level of suppression by the Sharon government, including outright suppression of the right to assembly and to hold demonstrations, led Natan Sharansky, in Sharon’s presence, to remark at a cabinet meeting that “It is frightening to see how an entire public of law-abiding citizens who oppose the disengagement are being de-legitimized.”

When he was advised that polls of the Likud showed he would win, Sharon had arranged for, and pledged to abide by, a vote of the Likud party membership on his disengagement plan. However, when the vote went against Sharon by a 3-2 margin, he repudiated his pledge. Despite the deep national divisions, he rejected the suggestion that a national referendum be held, even though Uri Dan, his long time supporter and confidant, wrote that “only a referendum will restore to Sharon the moral-political legitimacy needed to execute the plan.” Moshe Arens stated that the disengagement would be “inconceivable in any democratic society in this day and age”. Even Yoel Marcus, when he was still an enthusiastic supporter of “disengagement”, wrote that the government’s procedures engendered “this gnawing feeling of disgust inside me”.

11. The Continuing Degradation of the Internal Jewish Refugees from Gaza

On the eve on the expulsions, in his televised address to the nation, Prime Minister Sharon promised the Jewish residents who were about to be expelled from their homes: “…we shall not abandon you and after the evacuation we will do everything to rebuild your lives and communities anew.” Yet, as of the end of 2006, a study by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor revealed that only 56.8% of the Gaza expellees were employed (in contrast to 80% prior to disengagement). The average monthly salary among the expellees decreased sharply from $2,093 prior to disengagement to $1,281 in 2006, a drop of 39%.

In addition to a decrease in their standard of living, the expellees are faced with living in transitory housing accommodations, exacerbated family tensions leading to a rise in divorce and other familial difficulties and temporary schooling for their children. In no sense can it be said that adequate preparations were made by the government to help those expelled from their homes in the transition to a normal life.

This is even more outrageous when one considers that both Labor and Likud governments over the years encouraged Israelis to build communities in Gaza with the understanding that they would remain in place on a permanent basis.

12. Weakening of Position vis a vis the United States

The disengagement plan met with an unenthusiastic reception in Washington and it took several trips for the Sharon government to convince the Bush administration to support it. In its aftermath, the diminution of Israel’s deterrent capability, combined with the weakening of Israeli society, and the facilitating of a new terrorist safe haven in Gaza all detract from Israel’s reliability as an ally. Further, the fact that Israel on its own volition forcibly expelled its citizens en masse from their homes and businesses in 25 communities, with no quid pro quo of any kind, only increases the pressure upon Israel to do likewise in the future. Sharon’s statements that President Bush’s pledges to him constitute the quid pro quo reveal a lack of understanding of the American system of government, and recall President Eisenhower’s pledge to keep open the Straits of Tiran–a pledge which was dishonored a decade later when Egypt threatened to bar passage of Israeli ships prior to the Six Day War.

One must conclude that disengagement was a complete failure on every level (a “disaster” Nobel Laureate Prof. Robert Aumann told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee) and that Israel’s re-engagement with Gaza to defend itself will cost many lives. “What we had,” states Lt. Gen Moshe Ya’alon, “was disengagement from reality and disengagement from the truth. The entire process created a false hope that was not based on strategy or facts.” The precedent, established by Sharon’s disengagement plan, that an area relinquished to the control of the Palestinians should be forcibly cleared of every Jewish inhabitant (Prime Minister Sharon designated Gaza as "a region where Jews will not be living in any future agreement") runs counter to every moral and legal norm, not to mention common sense.

As Natan Sharansky has pointed out, if we cannot conceive of Jews living under Palestinian rule in an area relinquished by Israel, then that terrain should not be relinquished at all. Thus, in every respect, disengagement profoundly disfigured the moral landscape and damaged even further the prospect for reaching any kind of modus vivendi between Israel and its neighbors.

Roger A. Gerber’s most recent article in Outpost was “Israel’s Election Results” in May 2006.